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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate: (1) the relationship between audit commitee independence and earnings quality, and 
(2) the influence of CEO duality on this relationship. We posit that an independent audit committee is more effective 
in monitoring the quality of financial statements, hence independence is related to higher earnings quality. We also 
conjecture that the dual role of CEO and chairman would reduce the effectiveness of independent audit committees. 
Using a sample of 3,017 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2005-2010, we find that earnings 
quality is positively associated with audit committee independence, but the relationship is weakened by the existence 
of CEO duality. Our results imply that when a CEO has excessive control over the decisions of the board of directors 
by holding the position of chairman, the monitoring function of independent audit committees to assure high quality 
of earnings in financial statements becomes ineffective. 
 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of JIBES University, 
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1.  Introduction 
The corporate governance literature has highlighted the importance of board independence as one of 
& Jensen, 1983), i.e. a separation between the CEO and the 
chairmanship of the board. The opponents of CEO duality, including regulators, have expressed concerns 
that  duty to oversee management is compromised when the CEO chairs the board (Bliss, 
2011). The most recent Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG 2012) recommends that the 
positions of chairman and CEO should be held by different individuals, and the chairman must be a non-
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executive member of the board (Securities Commission, 2012, p.17).The code also emphasizes audit 
committee independence, including the audit committee  composition and functions.  
This study examines the relationship between audit committee independence and earnings quality, and 
whether CEO duality moderates this relationship. Using a sample of 3,017 non-financial companies listed 
on Bursa Malaysia for a six-year period from 2005-2010, we find that audit committee effectiveness has a 
significant effect on achieving high-quality reporting of earnings, but that the relationship is weakened by 
the existence of CEO duality. Our results imply that when a CEO has excessive control over the decisions 
of the board of directors by holding the position of chairman, the monitoring function of the independent 
audit committee to ensure high quality of earnings in financial statements becomes ineffective.  
The findings provide insight to regulators regarding corporate governance issues, specifically on two 
important aspects in the recent MCCG 2012, that is, audit committee independence and CEO duality. The 
evidence supports the release of the new MCCG 2012, which emphasis the importance of the independent 
audit committee and the separation of roles between CEO and chairman. The results also contribute to the 
literature on corporate governance, particularly audit committee effectiveness and board independence. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
Audit committee independence is one of the attributes of an effective corporate governance system. 
The greater the independence of the audit committee, the greater its ability to provide greater objectivity 
in monitoring the co This is because independent 
directors do not have personal or economic interests in the company that may interfere with their ability 
to question management (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004). Thus, they are able to put their arguments 
forward without fear or favor (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 2000). Independent directors 
also use their directorship to signal to the external market that they are decision experts who understand 
the importance of decision control and can work within such a control system. Therefore, relative to non-
independent directors, independent directors have a greater incentive to avoid activities that would 
damage their reputation (Abbott & Parker, 2000). 
Prior studies have discovered that audit committee independence is an important factor that contributes 
to a higher quality of financial reporting in terms of lesser financial restatements (Abbott et al., 2004), 
lower likelihood of fraudulent reporting (Beasley et al., 2000), lower level of earnings management 
(Klein, 2002), and lower level of income increasing abnormal accruals (Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, 2006). 
From the arguments, our first hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and earnings quality. 
Empirical research in corporate governance has also provided strong evidence that separation between 
the CEO and chairman roles is preferable as it improves the effectiveness of the board  monitoring 
function. Chau and Gray (2010) argue that a chairman who is independent has the freedom to manage a 
company without constraint as he possesses a great amount of power and authority. There is also evidence 
in the literature that the separation of roles between the CEO and chairman results in higher market 
valuation (Yermack, 1996). This suggests that unbiased monitoring of the CEO by the chairman signals 
stronger governance and internal controls, and leads to higher firm value. According to Jensen (1993), the 
presence of a chairman who is also the chief executive of a company could override the advantage of 
having independent directors on the board and weaken the function of the board of directors. Thus, we 
posit that the existence of a he effectiveness 
of the board, and especially of the audit committee, in monitoring the quality of financial statements. Our 
second hypothesis is that CEO duality moderates the relationship between audit committee independence 
and earnings quality. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1. Data 
Data for this study were collected from corporate reports and the Worldscope electronic database. The 
initial sample included all 4,998 observations of non-financial firms listed on the main market of Bursa 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur from year 2005 to 2010. The data required for the calculation of earnings quality 
for each firm-year observation are the changes in working capital, the cash flow from operation, the total 
revenues, the total assets, and the total gross property, plant and equipment. For data on CEO duality, 
audit committee independence, and auditor, we extracted information from annual corporate reports. 
Other control variables, such as leverage, size and market-to-book ratio, were downloaded from the 
Worldscope database. We excluded 1,981 observations with a missing value for any of the control 
variables. The final sample consists of 3,017 firm-year observations. From the final sample, the first and 
100th percentiles of all variables are winsorised to control for the effects of outliers on the regression 
results. 
3.2. Measurement of variables 
This study measures earnings quality using the cross-sectional estimation of accrual quality as in 
McNichols (2002). The model is based on the assumption that accruals map into cash realizations, thus 
any measurement errors in accruals that are not realized in cash flows indicate a low quality of accruals. 
The model also includes the adjustment for changes in  economic environment during the mapping 
of accruals. Regressions using the McNichols (2002) model are run cross-sectionally for each industry 
and year to estimate the quality of earnings (EQ) values for each firm from the year 2005 to 2010. The 
regressions generate six yearly residuals for each firm, i,t, which represents measurement errors in total 
current accruals. For an easier interpretation of the results, the absolute value of the residuals estimated 
from the model are multiplied by negative 1 to represent earnings quality (EQ), so that higher value 
reflects better quality of earnings.  
Similar to previous studies on audit committee effectiveness (e.g. Abbott et al., 2004 and Bradbury et 
al., 2006), we use a binary variable to represent audit committee independence (ACIND). The binary 
variable is coded 1 if all the audit committee members are independent and 0 otherwise. For CEO duality, 
DUALITY is also measured as a dichotomous variable, assigned 1 if the chief executive officer (or 
managing director) additionally occupies the position of chairman of the board, or 0 otherwise.  
3.3. Regression model 
To test the hypothesis of this study, we perform an ordinary least squares regression using the following 
multiple regression model:   
 
EQ = 0 1ACIND + 2DUALITY + 3DUALITY*ACIND + 4BIG4 5MTB  
6LEV 7SIZE 8 9V_SALES 10C_INTENSITY  
11CYCLE + 12V_CFO 13I_INTENSITY 14ZSCORE +   
(1) 
 
where BIG4 is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the firm was audited by a Big 4 auditor, 
otherwise 0; MTB is end-of-year share price divided by book value per share; LEV is total debt divided by 
total assets at the end of the financial year; SIZE is the log of total assets at the end of the financial year; 
LOSS is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reported negative earnings at the end of the 
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financial year, otherwise, 0; V_SALES is standard deviation of sales revenue for a lag of the six-year 
period; C_INTENSITY is the ratio of net book value of property, plant and equipment to total assets at the 
end of financial year; CYCLE is the 
by 30; V_CFO is the standard deviation of cash flows from operation during a lag six-year period; 
I_INTENSITY is the ratio of reported R&D and advertising expenses to total sales revenue at the end of 
financial year; ZSCORE is 
financial distress, otherwise 0. 
4. Findings 
4.1. Descriptive Analyses 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and test of difference for variables used in the regression 
model. The results show that non-duality firms have significantly lower capital intensity (C-INTENSITY) 
and intangible intensity (I_INTENSITY). In terms of operating cycle (CYCLE) and cash flow variability, 
the means for both variables are significantly higher in non-duality firms. No significant differences were 
found in other variables. For the dummy variables, we found that BIG4 audited 63.77% of the sample 
while distressed firms comprise around 42%. Firms that recorded a loss is 22.67% from the total sample.   
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Tests for Difference of Means 
Variable Non Duality (n=2582) Duality (n=435) Pooled (n=3017) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. mean-diff t-value 
EQ -0.062 0.063 -0.057 0.051 -0.005 -1.536 
MTB 1.027 0.793 1.048 0.844 -0.021 -0.501 
LEV 0.223 0.174 0.222 0.181 0.001 0.063 
SIZE 8.439 0.516 8.470 0.546 -0.030 -1.121 
V_SALES 0.259 0.179 0.249 0.154 0.010 1.096 
C_INTENSITY 0.382 0.202 0.403 0.203 -0.021** -2.032 
CYCLE 0.327 0.456 0.228 0.245 0.010* 4.425 
V_CFO 0.061 0.046 0.051 0.038 0.010* 4.262 
I_INTENSITY  0.021 0.107 0.037 0.130 -0.016* -2.881 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
4.2. Main empirical findings 
Table 2 presents regression estimates for testing the relationship between audit committee 
independence and earnings quality, and the moderating effect of CEO duality on this relationship. The 
results show that the coefficient for ACIND is not significant (p>0.010) in the duality sample, suggesting 
no evidence that audit committee independence has any impact on earnings quality in firms where the 
CEO also acts as chairman. For non-duality sample, the coefficient for ACIND is positive and highly 
significant, showing a positive relationship between audit committee independence and earnings quality. 
We incorporate the interaction variable DUALITY*ACIND in the equation for the pooled sample to test 
the moderating effect of CEO duality on the relationship between ACIND and EQ. The result, in column 3 
of Table 2, shows that the coefficient for DUALITY*ACIND is negatively significant, and implies that 
CEO duality weakens the impact of audit committee independence on earnings quality. To assure the 
internal validity of the results, we included a large number of control variables, of which most are 
significant. 
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Table 2. Audit Committee Independence, CEO Duality and Earnings Quality  
Sample Duality Non-Duality Pooled 
Statistics Coeff white-t Coeff white-t Coeff white-t 
INTERCEPT -0.107** -2.332 -0.064* -2.812 -0.074* -3.571 
ACIND -0.012 -1.504 0.009* 3.432 0.009* 3.313 
DUALITY 0.004 1.460 
DUALITY*ACIND -0.019** -2.185 
BIG4 -0.005 -1.068 -0.001 -0.298 -0.002 -0.659 
MTB -0.009** -2.365 -0.010* -5.015 -0.010* -5.467 
LEV 0.009 0.510 -0.002 -0.163 0.001 0.089 
SIZE 0.010*** 1.863 0.003 0.943 0.004 1.608 
V_SALES -0.052* -2.682 -0.019** -2.239 -0.023* -2.978 
C_INTENSITY 0.008 0.625 0.035* 5.318 0.031* 5.127 
CYCLE -0.007 -0.567 -0.006** -2.044 -0.005*** -1.835 
V_CFO -0.102 -1.600 -0.194* -5.578 -0.184* -5.798 
I_INTENSITY -0.053** -2.072 -0.011 -0.769 -0.021 -1.636 
ZSCORE -0.013*** -1.916 -0.008* -2.636 -0.009* -3.174 
Adj.R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Obs 435 2582 3017 
F-stat 2.809 12.807 12.174 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
4.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
Since the data are concentrated over a small number of years, the OLS standard errors from pooled 
regressions might be biased and result in incorrect inferences in the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence (Bernard, 1989). For sensitivity analysis, we employed the Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual 
regression estimate technique to cope with potential cross-sectional dependence problems. The 
coefficients for the parameters are obtained as the simple average from the cross-sectional regression. The 
t-statistics are the ratios of the mean estimated coefficients to the standard deviation of the distribution of 
the annual estimated slope coefficients, divided by the square root of the number of years. We find the 
results, not reported in the table, remain unchanged even after using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
technique, suggesting that the main results are robust. 
5. Conclusions 
This study hypothesizes and finds that audit committee independence has a significant influence on 
earnings quality, indicated by accruals. The presence of the dual role of CEO and chairman however, 
causes audit committee independence to become ineffective. The CEO duality, though not directly 
associated with lower accruals quality, weakens the relationship between audit committee independence 
and earnings quality. These findings provide support to the argument that CEO duality engenders 
dysfunctional audit committee even though all the members are independent directors, thereby supporting 
the recommendation of the newly-released MCCG 2012. 
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